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Abstract— Service and application requirements on network
resilience have increased over the past few years. New on-
line services such as e-commerce and connection-oriented in-
teractive real-time services require higher network resilience
than more traditional off-line services. Programmable virtual
networks promise fast and easy provisioning of new services
but no consideration to meet the diverse resilience require-
ments has been made. This paper discusses issues related to
resilience-differentiation in programmable virtual networks. A
set of general guidelines is presented that apply to resilience-
differentiation in programmable virtual network architectures. A
case study is used to illustrate how the proposed guidelines can
be met by extending an existing programmable virtual network
architecture.
I. INTRODUCTION
Network service survivability, or resilience, has gained
increasing interest over the past few years. The main reason is
that new on-line services such as e-commerce and connection-
oriented interactive real-time services require ever-increasing
network availability to meet their users’ expectations while
other off-line services such as email have low resilience
requirements. The diverse resilience demands add new re-
quirements on the network infrastructure. To increase effi-
cient utilisation of network resources, recovery scheme design
should take the different resilience requirements into account.
Traffic engineering methods [1] are a requirement to efficiently
provision resilience in a network. Recovery mechanisms can
be implemented at multiple network layers. They can even
be in operation simultaneously. The authors of [2] present
some guidelines on where to implement recovery mechanisms
and how to co-ordinate them if they are applied in more than
one layer. In general, lower layers such as wavelength-division
multiplexing (WDM) and synchronous digital hierarchy (SDH)
provide very fast recovery while higher layers like IP and
multiprotocol label switching (MPLS) provide higher resource
efficiency, flow and quality-of-service (QoS) granularity.
Programmable virtual networks are promoted as a solution
for fast and easy provisioning of new innovative services
over the Internet. The basic idea is to provide multiple
programmable virtual private networks (PVNs) over one phys-
ical infrastructure. Each virtual network customer (VNC) can
install and run customized code in virtual nodes to control
routing and support application specific tasks, such as con-
tent adaptation and monitoring. A number of different pro-
grammable virtual network architectures have been proposed
over the past few years, for example Tempest [3], Virtual
Active Network [4] and the Programmable Virtual Network
architecture [5]. However, the resilience issues related to a
programmable virtual network infrastructure have not been
addressed.
End-to-end resilience differentiation in overlay infrastruc-
tures introduces a new dimension, as the end-to-end resilience
provisioning can be split between the network provider and its
VNCs. Some of the challenges to provide resilience differen-
tiation in programmable virtual networks lie in the fact that a
VNC controls its own routing. Furthermore, it is important to
uphold PVN integrity and privacy. Traffic must never leak out
of or into a PVN. Scalability issues must be considered as well.
A programmable virtual network infrastructure can potentially
provide hundreds of PVNs, each supporting thousands of end-
to-end flows.
This paper addresses general resilience differentiation issues
related to programmable virtual networks. A set of general
guidelines that apply to programmable virtual network ar-
chitectures is presented. To illustrate how the guidelines can
be met, a resilience differentiation enhancement of the PVN
architecture [5] is proposed as a case study.
The rest of this document is organized as follows: Section II
discusses general issues related to resilience differentiation in
programmable virtual networks and presents a set of general
guidelines. Section III presents a case study of how resilience
differentiation can be incorporated in the Programmable Vir-
tual Network architecture [5] and Section IV shows how the
extended architecture meets both the general guidelines and
the specific goals of the original architecture. Conclusions are
given in Section V.
II. RESILIENCE ISSUES IN PROGRAMMABLE VIRTUAL
NETWORKS
A programmable virtual network realizes a number of
overlay networks over one physical infrastructure. Each over-
lay network is owned and managed by a VNC, while the
physical infrastructure is owned and managed by a network
provider (NP). This separation introduces new aspects on end-
to-end resilience provisioning. The goal is to satisfy end-users’
needs for end-to-end resilience in an efficient way. What is
considered efficient varies, but in general it can be measured
IEEE Communications Society 0-7803-8533-0/04/$20.00 (c) 2004 IEEE2117
TABLE I
RESILIENCE PROVISIONING MODELS IN VIRTUAL NETWORKS
Recovery End-user Scalability Flexibility Overhead
implementation signaling
NP NP Low Low Low
NP VNC High High Low
VNC VNC High Medium High
in terms of scalability, flexibility and overhead combined with
a target environment. A programmable virtual network is a two
layered network managed by different administrative entities.
Therefore, the end-to-end resilience can be provisioned in a
number of different ways. Resilience provisioning consists of
two parts: end-user signaling to establish resilient end-to-end
paths and provisioning of recovery mechanisms.
Whether the VNC or the NP should provision one, both or
none of these parts is an open issue that depends on the target
environment. Table I shows the possible provisioning models
and how they relate to scalability, flexibility and overhead. As
shown, NP provisioning of recovery mechanisms is efficient
in terms of overhead since the same recovery mechanisms
will be shared by all VNCs. In the NP/NP model, a full
mesh of virtual links have to be established between a VNC’s
virtual nodes. Thus the number of virtual links is bounded by
O(n2), where n is the number of virtual nodes, resulting in low
scalability. The other two models scale better, the number of
virtual links is bounded by O(n) as an effect of the customized
routing. The NP/VNC model offers highest flexibility. In this
model, the VNCs can choose to implement their own recovery
mechanisms or buy them from the NP. If a VNC choose to
provision its own recovery mechanisms, it is essential that
the virtual links used during normal and recovery operation
are physically disjoint. Otherwise it might not be possible to
recover from a single link or node failure.
When either the NP or a VNC provision both recovery
mechanisms and end-user signaling, there is no practical
difference compared to a non-overlay infrastructure. Methods
described in the literature [6], [7], [8] can be applied directly.
However, when end-to-end resilience provisioning is split
between the NP and its VNCs, the situation becomes more
complicated. The interface between the NP and the VNCs
must be very clear and fulfill a number of requirements, as
discussed below.
A. Split end-to-end resilience provisioning
Here, the NP implements a set of recovery mechanisms but
no end-user signaling; that responsibility is effectively pushed
to the VNCs. However, the NP must provide resilience hooks
to the VNCs. The hooks are used by the VNC to specify the
desired resilience level when mapping end-user traffic onto its
virtual links. Each VNC must be able to select an appropriate
set of resilience hooks on a link by link basis since they may
have different resilience requirements for different links.
Generally, finer resilience granularity implies higher re-
alization costs in the network. There is a clear trade-off
TABLE II
EXAMPLE SET OF RESILIENCE CLASSES
Resilience Class RC1 RC2 RC3 RC4
Resilience req. High Medium Low None
Recovery time < 100ms < 0.5s < 5s N/A
QoS Equivalent Temp. reduced Reduced None
between resilience granularity and realization cost. The need
for fine granularity indicates that the actual implementation of
recovery schemes should be located in the network layer [2],
[7], that is in IP or MPLS. Since provisioning of resilience
differentiation requires some grade of traffic engineering, the
underlying network should be based on MPLS or a protocol
with similar traffic engineering properties.
The authors of [6] propose a definition of resilience levels in
terms of resilience classes (RCs). A RC specifies a maximum
service disruption time for a set of expected failures such as all
single link and node failures. A RC may also specify the allow-
able reduction of QoS during recovery operation. A network
provider offers a limited set of well defined resilience classes
to its VNCs, for example the set of resilience classes shown
in Table II. In the table, RC1 offers the highest resilience
guarantees with a maximum service disruption time of 100
milliseconds and no QoS reduction. RC2 guarantees to recover
within 0.5 seconds with possible temporary QoS reduction.
Resilience class RC3 offers recovery within five seconds and
essentially permanent QoS reduction (until normal operation
is resumed). Finally, class RC4 has no recovery guarantees
nor does it promise to provide any QoS constraints. These
RCs can be extended and further subdivided if so desired.
The authors also present resilience signaling extensions to the
two dominating QoS models proposed by the Internet Engi-
neering Task Force (IETF): Differentiated Services (DiffServ)
and Integrated Services (IntServ) [9]. How many resilience
classes and what resilience levels to choose depend on the
network provider’s situation and expected VNC demands. A
programmable virtual network architecture should not restrict
the number of supported resilience classes.
When a network failure such as a link or node failure occurs
it may result in redirection of a number of flows. How the
redirection is carried out and how long it takes depends on
the recovery mechanism that protects the affected flows. In
ordinary networks, this would not impose any problem. In
the case of programmable virtual networks however, the re-
directed flows are owned and controlled by VNCs, not the
network provider. It is of vital importance that the redirec-
tion is handled transparently to the VNCs. This is a direct
implication of the resilience guarantees offered to the VNCs.
The guarantees imply that the NP takes full responsibility to
maintain operation in case of a link or node failure. Hence,
the redirection must be handled in the physical network,
transparent to the VNCs.
Another very important aspect of resilience differentiation
in programmable virtual networks is security. The integrity and
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privacy of PVNs must be maintained during network recovery
as well as during normal operation. Packets must never leak
out of or into a PVN. The consequences of misrouted traffic
between PVNs are potentially much worse than in non-overlay
infrastructures since layer-three addresses can be reused in
different PVNs.
VNCs will have access to a PVN in which the virtual links
are provided with resilience hooks. The VNCs can apply any
resilience signaling protocol such as the extended DiffServ
and IntServ protocols proposed in [6] to provision end-to-end
resilience. A VNC may choose to implement its own recovery
schemes even though it could buy resilience classified hooks
from the network provider. In such cases VNC should be
signaled when a virtual link goes down or perceives degraded
QoS.
A summary of the architectural guidelines for resilience
differentiated programmable virtual networks are presented
below. The architecture:
• must be based on a network infrastructure that offers
traffic engineering capabilities.
• must support a limited but sufficiently large set of re-
silience classes.
• must provide VNCs with hooks to a suitable subset of
the supported resilience classes.
• must provide VNC-transparent traffic redirection during
recovery operation.
• must uphold PVN integrity and privacy.
• should notify the VNCs when a virtual link failure or
QoS de-gradation occurs.
III. RESILIENCE DIFFERENTIATION IN THE PVN
ARCHITECTURE
A. PVN Architecture
The Programmable Virtual Network architecture [5] is an
MPLS-based approach that introduces programmability in a
carrier grade environment. It basically provides VNCs with a
full set of virtual MPLS network resources including labels,
links and nodes. The main goals of the Programmable Virtual
Network architecture are:
- Scalability achieved through a fast data transit path and
efficient active packet identification and extraction.
- Flexibility to support a wide range of applications,
including those with very high processing requirements,
without compromising scalability.
- Migration path through gradual provisioning of pro-
cessing capability and expansion of active network ap-
plications over legacy infrastructure.
Fig. 1 shows the Programmable Virtual Network node archi-
tecture with two Active Processors. The Active Processors vir-
tualise all resources exposed to the VNCs and enforce policies
in the MPLS abstraction layer. The Executional Environments
(EEs) represent the virtual nodes. An EE has access rights to a
set of virtual links and a contiguous block of virtual labels. The
label switched router (LSR) is an MPLS switch that conforms
to the MPLS standard. The Active Processors are connected
to the LSR via a set of label switched paths (LSPs) and a
management port. The LSPs carry packets that either require
some active processing in the node or originate from EEs in
the node’s Active Processors. There are two distinct types of
flows; the first type carries active packets destined to an EE
inside the node, the second type carries transit traffic.
The Programmable Virtual Network architecture uses a two-
level label stack. The outer (top) label denotes an MPLS tunnel
between two nodes while the inner (bottom) label represents a
VNC controlled LSP. The inner label is used by the network
provider’s control plane to identify both a VNC and the VNC’s
label. Hence, it is possible to multiplex LSPs controlled by
different VNCs onto the same MPLS tunnel. Furthermore, the
inner label is used by the forwarding plane to either divert
active packets to the corresponding EE or to an outgoing
MPLS tunnel. MPLS tunnels start and terminate in LSRs while
VNC controlled LSPs start and terminate in EEs.
B. MPLS-based recovery
MPLS has attracted considerable attention because of its
traffic engineering properties [10], [11] and its ability to
achieve fast and efficient recovery. A framework for MPLS
recovery [7] has been published by the IETF MPLS working
group. It discusses issues related to fast and reliable fault
detection and recovery mechanisms in MPLS networks. It
concludes that MPLS-based recovery can detect a failure and
recover traffic on a time scale comparable to synchronous
Optical Network (SONET), which is about 50 milliseconds
[12]. On top of fast recovery, MPLS provides both high flow
recovery granularity and QoS granularity.
A number of different recovery schemes have already been
developed [13], [14]. Each recovery mechanism has its own
properties in terms of recovery time, QoS preservation, re-
source utilization and overhead. Which recovery scheme to
choose for a given resilience class is an open issue, although
some guidelines are given in [6]. If more than one resilience
class is provided by a network provider, it is likely that more
than one recovery scheme will be implemented in the network.
C. Resilience extensions
To extend the PVN architecture with resilience differentia-
tion, care must be taken so the architecture’s original design
goals, as outlined in III-A, remain fulfilled. The resilience
extension targets the two- layered approach where the network
provider supplies resilience hooks to the VNCs who in turn
provide the end-user signaling. How the VNCs provision the
end-user signaling is beyond the scope of this paper.
The Resilience Module in Fig. 1 represents the major part
of the architecture extension. It is inserted as a middleware
layer between the management ports of the Active Processors
and the LSR. It contains three major functional blocks. First,
it provides a set of recovery engines, each implementing
one or more recovery mechanisms. Second, it provides a
recovery redirection block that offers redirection support to the
recovery engines while hiding eventual redirections from the
management block. The label information base (LIB) in legacy























Fig. 1. Extended PVN node architecture with two Active Processors
LSRs is often designed to support fast packet forwarding and
hence not very flexible. Therefore, the resilience redirection
layer implements an extended variant of the LIB called ELIB.
The ELIB provides the additional functionality required in the
control plane. Note that the forwarding plane still uses the
LIB. Finally, the Resilience Module provides a management
block. This block process all configuration requests initiated
by the EEs.
A VNC buys virtual links and interfaces from the network
provider. A virtual link connects two EEs, or virtual nodes,
with each other and a virtual interface is used to transmit
and receive data over a virtual link. Instead of purchasing one
virtual interface per virtual link, as in the original architecture,
a set of virtual interfaces is purchased. Each virtual interface
corresponds to a specific resilience class.
The abstraction layer in the Active Processor maps the
virtual interfaces to a tunnel protected by a suitable recovery
engine, which typically provides the same resilience class as
the virtual interface. However, it can be mapped to a an engine
that provides higher resilience.
Fig. 2 shows a simple subset of a Programmable Virtual Net-
work with two programmable nodes. The set of gray-colored
MPLS tunnels, marked with capital letters, are configured
in the nodes by the network provider. Another set of LSPs,
marked with small letters, are configured by the VNC residing
in the displayed EEs. LSPs C, D and G can be considered as
tunnel extensions to reach the appropriate Active Processors
but are not conceptually part of the tunnels.
Packets following LSP p are regarded as active packets
as they are diverted to an EE. Likewise, packets on LSP r
are considered active since they originate from an EE. Note
that packets may be active in one programmable node while
inactive in others.
The Resilience Module (RM) in node 1 supervises tunnel
E. The Resilience Module is configured to switch all traffic in
tunnel E to tunnel E’ if a physical link or node failure occurs
along tunnel E. Observe that tunnels E and E’ can be routed
over several intermediate LSRs including other programmable
nodes. The switch-over time depends on what recovery engine
that is used. Fig. 3 shows a snapshot of the ELIB and LIB


























Fig. 2. MPLS Tunnels and VNC controlled LSPs
When a tunnel failure occurs and the corresponding recovery
engine initiates a redirection request, two things take place
in the redirection layer. First, the corresponding entry in the
ELIB is modified to point to the new desired tunnel E’ as
shown in Fig. 3. Second, all entries in the LSR’s LIB that
point to tunnel E are re-mapped to tunnel E’. Whether tunnel
E’ is pre-established or dynamically signaled and allocated
when a failure occurs depends on the recovery mechanism
implemented by the supervising recovery engine. When a
recovery engine detects that a tunnel is down or perceives
degraded QoS it signals this to the management block. The
management block forwards the signal to all EEs that have a
virtual interface mapped to the failing tunnel.
When the Management block in the Resilience Module
receives a configuration request from an EE it translates
the virtual interface to a tunnel (label) before the request
is forwarded to the redirection layer. The redirection layer
then checks if there is any active redirection for that tunnel,
in which case a substitution is made before the actual LIB
configuration is carried out in the LSR. To illustrate this
procedure, suppose that tunnel E has been re-directed to E’
when the setup request of LSP n is made in PVN node 1,
see Fig. 2 and Fig. 3. First, the management block translates
the virtual interface to tunnel E. Next, the redirection layer
configures its ELIB to swap label n with label q and forward
the packets over tunnel E. However, tunnel E is currently re-
directed to tunnel E’, so E is substituted with E’ before the
request is forwarded to the LIB. In PVN node 2, no special
precautions are required, thus both the ELIB and the LIB are
configured to swap label q with label t and forward over tunnel
H. Consider the incoming packet in PVN node 1 shown in
Fig. 2. The top label A is popped and the inner label n is
swapped with label q before the packet is forwarded on tunnel
E’ according to PVN node 1’s LIB configuration, as shown in
Fig. 3. when the packet arrives in PVN node 2, its top label E’
is popped and its inner label q is swapped with label t before it
is forwarded on tunnel H. The ELIB is never used to perform
any forwarding actions in the LSRs.
IV. GUIDELINE CONFORMANCE
The guidelines presented in Section II are all met by the
proposed resilience differentiation extension:
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Fig. 3. ELIB and LIB configurations
• The PVN architecture is based on MPLS and therefore
offers a sufficient level of traffic engineering.
• The network provider can use multiple recovery engines
simultaneously to meet any desired number of supported
resilience classes. The extended architecture can even
support resilience classes with recovery times as low as
50 milliseconds.
• The virtual interfaces provide the necessary resilience
hooks for a VNC to assign end-user flows to different
resilience classes.
• The Recovery redirection block provides the required
VNC transparency during recovery operation.
• The VNC identification is based on the inner label,
hence it is independent of the outer label (tunnel). This
guarantees that the packets belonging to different VNCs
do not leak either into or out of the PVNs.
• When a recovery engine detects tunnel failure or QoS
degradation it signals this to the Management block in
the Resilience Module, which in turn makes sure that the
affected EEs are notified.
The proposed extension also meets the Programmable Vir-
tual Network architecture’s main goals as outlined in Section
III-A. The extension leaves both the fast transit path and
active packet identification and extraction principles unaltered.
It does, however, introduce a larger set of MPLS tunnels:
one extra tunnel for each peering PVN nodes and supported
resilience classes. A consequence is that the size of the LIB
increases and the maximum number of possible independent
MPLS tunnels decreases. This fact should be considered when
determining the resilience granularity. The ELIB is only used
in the control plane, hence it does not affect the forwarding
performance in the LSRs.
The proposed resilience extension has no negative effects on
flexibility. In fact, the extension enhances flexibility. An even
wider range of services and applications can be supported,
because the Programmable Virtual Network architecture now
provides resilience differentiation to the VNCs. Finally, the
migration path is not affected by the resilience extension.
However, recovery mechanisms that require forwarding func-
tionality beyond the MPLS standard might not be supported.
A legacy LSR may provide the required extra forwarding
functionality but it is not required to provide anything more
than the MPLS standard specifies.
V. CONCLUSION
New services and applications create an increasingly large
diversion of network resilience requirements. Programmable
virtual networks aim to improve fast and easy provisioning of
new services and applications but have, so far, left resilience-
related issues unexplored. This paper discusses those issues
and provides a set of guidelines that a resilience differentiated
programmable virtual network architecture should conform to.
An extension to the Programmable Virtual Network architec-
ture was proposed as a case study to show how the guidelines
could be met while upholding the architecture’s original design
goals. In future work, we hope to implement the proposed
architecture extension along with a set of recovery engines in
the CRC Smart Internet testbed.
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